






Indigenous Innovation and Industrialization:
Foundations of Japanese Development and Advantage
William Lazonick and William Mass
MITJP 95-03
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
i
i-----





Indigenous Innovation and Industrialization:
Foundations of Japanese Development and Advantage
William Lazonick and William Mass
MITJP 95-03
Distributed Courtesy of the
MIT Japan Program
Science * Technology * Management
Center for International Studies





© MIT Japan Program
About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as
well as support from the government and from private foundations, have
made it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated
center of applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their
relations involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely
positioned to make use of MIT's extensive network of Japan-related
resources, which include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as
well as a Tokyo-based office. Through its three core activities, namely,
education, research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates
both to its sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese
science and technology and on how that science and technology is
managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
Indigenous Innovation and Industrialization:
Foundations of Japanese Development and Advantage
William Lazonick and William Mass
University of Massachusetts Lowell
I. Indigenous Innovation
In the twentieth-century experience of economic growth, the case of Japan stands out.
Here is an economy that, in terms of GNP per head, transformed itself from one of the
poorer nations in the world at the beginning of the century into one of the richest by the
1980s.
Is the case of Japan unique? If so, its experience has little to teach us about the develop-
ment paths, possibilities, and problems of other nations. Or have the driving forces of
Japanese economic development during this century also been operative in the
successful development of other leading industrial economies? ' If so,' an understanding of
the case of Japan in comparative perspective can 'contribute to the theoretical
conceptualization of the process of economic development more generally.
Our main argument can be simply stated: a central determinant of Japan's phenomenal
economic success during this century was indigenous innovation. The specific
institutional structures that enabled Japan to engage in indigenous innovation are peculiar,
if not unique, to that nation. But the organizational principles on which these institutions
operated, as well as the centrality of indigenous innovation to the process of economic
development, make the Japanese case relevant fr'understanding development and
underdevelopment around the world.
What makes the Japanese case important is not just its own growth record but the fact
that Japan achieved this growth by successfully challenging the industrial leadership of
the most powerful economies in the world. Indeed, Japan challenged'the existing leaders,
not in the industries where they were weakest, but the ones in which they were strongest.
Hence, in the 1920s and 1930s Japan took on B'ritain in textiles, in the 1970s and 1980s
the United States in consumer electronics 'aind'mass-produced' automobiles," and in the
1990s Germany in machine tools and luxury 'automobiies.
What is indigenous innovation? By innovation, we mean ways of transforming inputs into
outputs that, given prevailing factor prices, result in products of higher quality and/or lower
cost than had previously been available. By this' definitionri, innovation provides the basis
for increasing value to the consumer without reducing returns to the producer.
By indigenous innovation, we mean simply that new products and new processes that
permit the delivery of higher quality at lower cost originate within a nation. Indigenous
innovation permits a nation to experience economic development in terms of rising real
per capita incomes.
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To analyze the process of economic development invariably requires an understanding of
the strategies and structures of the productive entities within a nation -- individuals,
enterprises, industries, regions -- that participate in the innovation process. As an
overriding political unit, however, the nation can play a critical role in providing coherence
to these strategies and structures in ways that facilitate the innovation process.
Innovation is the source of sustainable competitive advantage -- that is, competitive
advantage that does not depend on a lowering of the standards of living of those who
participate in the process of delivering value to consumers. When the gains to innovation
are shared between producers and consumers, standards of living rise because of both
higher returns to the factors of production and lower expenditures per unit of value
consumed. The result is economic development.
The innovation process requires the generation and the utilization of knowledge that
becomes embodied in new products and new processes. The generation of knowledge
and its embodiment in products and processes takes time and has costs but does not in
and of itself yield returns to innovation [see Lazonick 1991:ch.3; Lazonick 1993]. For
returns to innovation to occur, the new products and processes must be utilized
sufficiently to yield costs per unit of consumable service that are lower than those
previously attainable.
Indigenous innovation is by no means inconsistent with borrowing technology from
abroad. The history of economic development shows that borrowing technology is central
to indigenous innovation. The borrowing that results in indigenous innovation does not
simply entail imported machines and foreign specialists. Rather what must be borrowed is
existing knowledge on the basis of which indigenous entities (enterprises, industries,
regions) can develop new knowledge that can in turn be embodied in innovations.
Indigenous innovation builds on knowledge acquired abroad to develop unique productive
capabilities at home.
An alternative to the indigenous innovation hypothesis is one that argues that nations gain
global competitive advantage by combining imported machines and foreign specialists
with the cheap labor of the indigenous labor force. Access to labor that will work long and
hard hours for low wages, according to this hypothesis, enables a nation to capture
markets in low value-added industries. The implicit developmental assumption is that,
over time, competitive advantage based on cheap labor can be used to move into higher
value-added industries that permit a higher standard of living in terms of remuneration and
work conditions.
Japanese history does not support the cheap labor hypothesis [see Mass and Lazonick
1990]. Had low wages and high effort been the prime sources of Japanese competitive
advantage, Japan would not have been the success story of twentieth-century economic
development. It was indigenous innovation, not cheap labor or even cheap capital, that
permitted Japan to transform itself from a low-wage economy in the early twentieth
century to a high-wage economy by the 1970s.
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II. The Analysis of Indigenous Innovation
Why was Japan able to engage in indigenous innovation? Were the conditions that made
Japan an indigenous innovator peculiar to that nation? Or was Japan doing something in
similar ways that successful industrializers such as Britain, United States, and Germany
had done before? And what about much less successful industrializers such as India,
China, and Brazil? Can an understanding of the Japanese experience reveal what has
been lacking in less developed nations that has blocked indigenous innovation?
To study indigenous innovation, we require an analytical framework that can comprehend
the key elements in the innovation process. In an informative book on technology transfer
to Japan, Takeshi Hayashi [1990] distinguishes five factors - what he calls the five Ms --
that promote indigenous innovation: management, manpower, machinery, materials, and
markets. To these we would add a sixth M: money, which actually should come first on
the list.
Money, or finance, plays a critical role in the innovation process because those who
control money get to choose what type of strategy an enterprise will pursue. An
innovative strategy inherently entails fixed costs because expenditures have to be made
on "machinery" (that is, plant and equipment) and certain types of "manpower" (including
those people who inhabit the managerial structure) with a time lag before the receipt of
returns. These fixed costs are high because of not only the scale of investments but also
the developmental period that (by definition) must occur before the investments that entail
fixed costs can generate returns.
Those who control money may or may not make strategic decisions that entail innovation -
- they may or may not act as entrepreneurs. Strategic decision-makers can, and often do,
decide not to be innovative but to produce on the basis of resources that already exist
within the company or that can be readily purchased on factor markets - what we have
labeled an adaptive strategy. A necessary condition for innovation is that those who
control financial resources choose innovative investment strategies rather than adaptive
investment strategies.
They must, moreover, keep financial resources committed to the innovative strategy until
the products and processes are sufficiently developed and utilized so that they generate
returns. A failure to generate returns at any point in time may be a manifestation, not of a
failed strategy, but of the need to commit even more financial resources to an ongoing
learning process. To keep money committed to the innovative investment strategy, those
who control money must have intimate knowledge of the problems and possibilities of the
investment strategy, or entrust their money to strategic managers who have such
knowledge.
Management is required to plan and coordinate the development of the specialized
division of labor and the integration of the specialized productive activities required for an
innovation to emerge. The innovative efforts that count for economic development
invariably involve continuous, cumulative, and collective learning. Continuous learning
results in the improvement of skills. Without continuous learning, acquired capabilities
atrophy. Cumulative learning permits the use of acquired technological capabilities as the
foundations for acquiring new capabilities. Without cumulative learning, more complex
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capabilities cannot build on fundamental capabilities already acquired. Collective learning
enables the planned coordination of specialized divisions of labor to develop new
technology and generate productivity. Without collective learning, planned coordination is
an economic burden rather than an economic benefit. Management's role in an
innovative enterprise is to ensure the continuity, cumulativity, and collectivity of the
learning process.
Manpower -- or labor power to be gender neutral at the sacrifice of alliteration -- is the
input into the innovation process that can potentially learn. But, because of the
continuous, cumulative, and collective character of the learning process, individuals
cannot just learn as they please. Central to the innovative strategy is investment in the
capabilities of those people who comprise the specialized division of labor that
management must plan and coordinate.
Strategic decision-makers ("money") do not invest in all of the people whom they employ,
but only in those people whom they expect to participate in the collective learning process.
Strategic decision-makers do not want to invest in people who will exit the enterprise with
their human assets. Nor do they want to invest in people who will use their voice within
the enterprise to subvert rather than support the process of innovation.
Machines combine with manpower to transform materials into products. Innovation in
machinery is both skill-displacing and skill-augmenting. It is skill-displacing because
certain productive capabilities that used to reside in manpower can now be more
effectively performed by machines. It is skill-augmenting because innovation in machinery
requires the application of new knowledge to develop the machinery and utilize it
effectively in the production process. Machines can affect the productivity of a given
product and the quality of the product produced. There is generally an intricate relation
between innovation in materials and innovation in machines. Innovation in machines and
materials both in turn depend on the complementary skills of manpower.
Materials are the substances that people as labor power transform into products. As such
materials become embodied in work-in-process -- components, parts, and intermediate
goods. An understanding of the character of these materials in their raw and semi-
processed states is critical for the innovation process to take place. A key innovation may
entail the creation of new materials through chemistry or the blend of materials that enter
the production process. The quality of materials and semi-processed inventories will
affect not only the quality of the product but also the ways in which machines and
manpower are developed and utilized.
In particular, high-throughput production processes require "high-throughput" materials --
that is, materials that do not cause machine stoppages and costly downtime, At the same
time, costs are also increased by the wastage of materials because of the application of
inadequate skills and inferior machinery in the production process. The combination of
manpower, machines, and materials constitutes the enterprise's technology.
Markets provide the opportunity for the enterprise to generate returns on the investments
in organization ("management") and technology ("manpower", "machines", "materials").
The strategic role of "money" is to decide for which markets the enterprise should produce




Identification of markets, actual or potential, that can be served by the enterprise's
technological capabilities is critical to the strategic decision making process, while gaining
access to new markets is central to the actual innovation process. Given strategic
decisions to compete for markets through innovation, management's role is to ensure the
transformation of inputs into outputs in ways that generate learning and productivity so
that the resultant products are ones that buyers both want and can afford.
III. Japan versus United States
From the perspective of the American economy, the most formidable competitive
challenges since the 1960s have come from the Japanese. These competitive challenges
did not occur in those industries in which it was weakest but rather in industries devoted to
the mass production of consumer durables -- specifically, consumer electronics and
automobiles -- in which the United States led the world. To complement these strategies,
the Japanese also developed a steel industry that far surpassed that of the United States
in productivity. As a backward linkage from their sustained competitive advantage in
consumer durables, moreover, the Japanese pursued effective innovative strategies in
semiconductors and machine tools. An understanding of the sources of Japanese
competitive advantage requires an analysis of how the Japanese organized the six Ms of
enterprise to generate technological innovation and competitive advantage.
Money
Innovation requires financial commitment so that high fixed-cost investments in physical
and human resources ("machines" and "manpower") can be transformed into high quality,
low cost products. In Japan, before World War 11, the prime source of financial
commitment was the family firm. Continuous innovation came from owner-entrepreneurs
who used their profits from one successful investment to' fund the next investment. In
mining, shipping, shipbuilding, and steel, the innovative family firm was typically a "house"
of family members -- the famous zaibatsu - which delegated operating control, and
usually strategic decision-making as well, to professional managers. The zaibatsu, or
their constituent companies, also provided funds to new venttires with varied success
[Morikawa 1992].
After World War II, under the American occupation, the zaibatsu were dissolved, and
shares were disbursed among companies, financial institutions, and individuals [Gerlach
1992; Miyajima 1994]. But, when the Americans left, a movement began among
Japanese enterprises engaged in long-term investment strategies to ensure that
ownership stakes in their companies rested in the hands of stable shareholders --
generally other companies and banks with whom they had long-term business relations --
who would provide financial commitment.
These stable shareholders did not, and still do not, sell their shares to public investors
(who speculate on the Tokyo Stock Exchange). Nor do they demand high dividends.
Stable shareholders instead ensure that company earnings remain under the control of
the professional managers who run the enterprises, thus' creating the financial
commitment necessary for continuous innovation. It is through their business relations
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rather than through their equity stakes that stable shareholders actually share in the gains
of innovation.
In the United States, owner-entrepreneurs have played the same role as in Japan in
pursuing innovative investment strategies. Contrary to American folklore, new ventures
have never been financed by the stock market. Rather the stock market serves as a
means for successful companies -- ones that through innovation have transformed
themselves from new ventures into going concerns -- to permit the owner-entrepreneurs
and their backers (venture capitalists) to monetize the productive assets that they have
accumulated. This monetization occurs by the transfer of ownership rights from the
original owner-entrepreneurs to portfolio investors willing to hold the shares of the
companies that the entrepreneurs have built up [see Lazonick 1992; Lazonick 1994;
Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1995a].
As a result of the creation of a national market in industrial securities around the turn of
the century, shares in the major American industrial corporations became widely
distributed among wealthholding households that would not and could not exercise
strategic control over the corporations that they now owned. Rather, ownership of the
company's assets was separated from control over strategic decision-making. The
strategic decision-makers were professional managers, many of whom had the interest
and ability to use the financial resources of their companies to engage in continuous
innovation.
In Japan, strategic decision-making power in the pre-World War II zaibatsu was often,
although not always, delegated to professional managers. Under these arrangements,
enterprise earnings tended to be plowed back into new investments. The managers who
controlled money understood the opportunities and requirements of innovative investment
strategies. The dissolution of the zaibatsu only increased the incentive and ability of top
managers in Japan to engage in innovation.
In the United States, by contrast, the widespread distribution of shareholders left
professional managers in positions of strategic decision-making power by default rather
than design. This separation of ownership from control persisted well into the post-World
War decades. By virtue of professional careers spent primarily climbing up and around
the managerial organization, these strategic decision-makers -- the controllers of money --
had an intimate knowledge of the other five Ms. Possession of this knowledge enabled
these top managers to evaluate the prospects for success of innovative investment
strategies, while their own individual goals, shaped as they were by their professional
careers and membership in the organization, gave them a bias in favor of innovating
rather than adapting.
Over the past two decades or so, however, the rise of the institutional portfolio investor in
the United States has permitted the concentration of share ownership. These new
shareholders have been willing and able to extract earnings from existing industrial
corporations, but without ensuring that this money would end up under the control of new
organizations that are able and willing to engage in continuous innovation. In many indus-
trial corporations, even when strategic decision-makers are not threatened with a loss of




portfolios lead them to favor immediate financial returns over the long-term requirements
of innovation.
In sum, even though, from the late nineteenth century both Japan and United States
experienced a managerial revolution that persists to the present, the systems of corporate
governance in the two nations differ significantly. During the first half of this century,
American top managers as strategic decision-makers controlled money, and invested in
innovation. The fragmentation of shareholders rendered owners impotent in influencing
the choice of corporate strategy.
Since the 1950s, Japanese managers as strategic decision-makers have controlled
money, and have invested in innovation, not because owners have been rendered
impotent but because ownership is in the hands of business organizations that have a
common interest in innovation. This pressure to invest in innovation has been increased
by the ability of enterprise unions to ensure that a large proportion of the labor force has
permanent employment status, and hence has an interest in the long-term prosperity of
the enterprise.
Meanwhile, American managers as strategic decision-makers have progressively lost
control over money, and have become less able and willing to invest in innovation.
Increasingly, financial interests that seek to extract the returns of past investments -- or,
as some financial economists put it, to "disgorge the free cash flow" -- have gained
influence and control over corporate strategy. At the same time, the declining power of
the organized labor movement in the United States as well as erosion of employment
security within managerial structures themselves have reduced the number and power of
stakeholders in the enterprise who have an interest in an innovative investment strategy
or the ability to carry one out. The result has been a mounting tendency in American
corporations to choose adaptive strategies that live off resources accumulated in the past
rather than invest in innovation for the sake of future prosperity.
Management
The shift in strategic decision-making from innovation to adaptation manifests the notion,
prevalent in the United States but not in Japan, that the company is run for its owners.
Yet, even in the United States during the period when share ownership was effectively
separated from strategic control, companies were de facto, even if not de jure, run for the
sake of their organizations -- which in the United States meant their managerial structures
(or what John Kenneth Galbraith [1967] called the "technostructure").
Especially where complex technologies were the foundation of a corporation's competitive
advantage and market dominance, a company required managerial structures to plan and
coordinate the specialized divisions of labor of their enterprises [see Lazonick and Mass
1995]. These highly collectivized managerial structures could engage in continuous and
cumulative learning. It was this collective -- or organizational - capability embodied in
cohesive managerial structures that made the United States a formidable industrial power.
The key to creating these organizational capabilities was the long-term attachment of
managerial employees to the enterprise -- similar in practice to what the Japanese call
"permanent employment". American companies recruited graduates of colleges or
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aprofessional schools to begin their careers as lower level specialists within the managerial
structure. Subsequently, management development programs transferred the most
promising specialists around the organization and promoted them up the managerial
hierarchy.
By giving these employees a broader understanding of company operations and by
placing them in positions of increasing authority and responsibility, the management
development programs gradually transformed a portion of the specialists into generalists
who could plan and coordinate the specialized divisions of labor under their control. After
two or three decades with the company, a small number of these generalists would reach
top management positions where they would assume control over strategic decision
making.
This system of career-long employment and advancement not only transformed
specialists into generalists but also worked as a powerful motivator for specialists and
generalists alike to identify with the goals of the enterprise. Given the separation of
ownership from control, it was this integration of highly skilled individuals into the
organization as a collectivity that was the essence of the managerial revolution in the
United States [Lazonick 1986].
As both cause and effect of the movement from innovative to adaptive investment
strategies in the United States, organizational integration of the managerial structure has
been breaking down. At the top, strategic managers, rewarded with exceedingly high pay
and valuable stock options, have been under pressure to show high earnings and pay out
high dividends in the short run at the expense of long-run investments in innovation. With
the turn from innovation to adaptation, the long-term attachment of managerial personnel
to the organization ceases to be conceived by strategic managers as a costly-to-replace
organizational asset but simply as an immediate expense that drags down earnings.
Short-term relations with consultants, contractors, and employees become viewed as
essential to "flexibility". These relations may permit flexibility in maintaining high corporate
earnings. They do not, however, provide flexibility for shifting from one innovation to the
next as a continuous process.
From this perspective on the rise and decline of U.S. managerial capitalism, the
formidable organizational capabilities that the Japanese have put in place reflect a more
thoroughgoing elaboration of an earlier U.S. model rather than a wholly new departure in
internal organization. The Japanese corporations have elaborated American managerial
capitalism of an earlier era into a more collective capitalism by developing long-term
relations with employees not only in the managerial structure but also on the shop floor.
In terms of mode of payment (salaries and shares in the gains of innovation) and
employment conditions (permanent tenure and skill development), shop-floor workers in
major Japanese corporations are in much the same position as managerial employees in
both Japanese and American enterprises. Similarly, the long-term relation of major
Japanese corporations with their suppliers -- that is, with vertically related, but legally dis-
tinct, firms -- is today even stronger than the relation between American corporations and
their managerial employees. Japanese enterprises are more organizationally integrated
than American enterprises, and it is this superior organizational integration that is the key




Organizationally integrated relations with shop-floor workers and suppliers permit
Japanese managers to plan and coordinate specialized divisions of labor in ways that are
unattainable for the managers of most American corporations, which at best have
collective capabilities only within the managerial structure. As a result, Japanese
managers can contemplate innovative investment strategies that are not realistic options
for strategic decision-makers in U.S. enterprises even when their managerial organiza-
tions are integrated and intact. As an elaboration of the organizational principles of
American managerial capitalism, Japanese collective capitalism creates very different
possibilities for the development and utilization of manpower, materials and machines.
Manpower
In the United States, the ideology underlying corporate governance is that the enterprise
is run for owners. This despite the fact that American capitalism became dominant in the
world economy during the era when the separation of ownership from control
characterized those very corporations that engaged in continuous innovation. The
American ideology was, and remains, that the managers (in many cases tens of
thousands of them) were but the agents of the owners (as "principles"), and that "hourly
workers" were interchangeable units of a commodity called labor.
Consistent with the ideology of the "hourly worker", when owners were fragmented and
managers had control, the innovative strategies of most major U.S. corporations entailed
massive investments in the capabilities of employees within the managerial structure but
did not include investing in the skills of shop-floor workers. Because of a historical legacy
of conflict with craft labor over the utilization of new technology, American managers
became obsessed with taking skills off the shop floor, vesting them instead in managerial
employees and the machines that these managerial employees designed, installed, and
repaired [see Lazonick 1990:chs.7-10].
This investment strategy worked in the first half of this century. In industries based on
complex technology, the companies that made the innovative investments in
organizational capabilities within the managerial structure gained sustained competitive
advantage. Particularly in science-based electrical and chemical industries, critical
organizational capabilities resided in the corporate laboratories put in place to engage in
continuous innovation.
In the 1920s those companies that had emerged as dominant used their sustained
competitive advantages to gain the cooperation of nonunionized shop-floor labor by
offering them more employment security and higher wages than they could get elsewhere
in the economy. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the gains of the 1920s were
used to keep managerial structures, and their capabilities for continuous innovation, intact.
In the 1940s and 1950s, sustained competitive advantage was used, as in the 1920s, to
gain the cooperation of shop-floor workers, but under the changed conditions of
institutionalized collective bargaining with the new mass-production unions.
The American investment strategy began to break down when the Japanese built
organizational capabilities not only within the managerial structure but also on the shop
floor. In a nation that embarked on a mission of industrialization without a legacy of craft
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skills, Japanese companies never had to confront craft unions over the utilization of new
technology. In sharp contrast to American investment strategies that were bent on taking
skills off the shop floor, a prime focus of the investment strategies of Japanese companies
was to develop skills on the shop floor. For this reason, Japanese companies have
always invested in the skills of those blue-collar workers who were committed to the paid
labor force (that is, males).
To protect these investments in human assets, Japanese companies have extended to
those shop-floor employees in whom they have invested permanent membership in the
organization on a par with most managerial employees. In the post-World War II period,
the rise of enterprise unions made this permanent membership explicit in the form of the
widely recognized, even if noncontractual, practice of permanent employment. The other
side of the same collective coin is the subordinate position of ownership rights to
membership rights in the Japanese corporation [Dore 1993].
The Japanese company is run for its employees, not for its owners, because it is
recognized that it is the employees as a collectivity who constitute the unique competitive
assets that the company possesses. That these assets include the skills of shop-floor
workers has permitted the Japanese to develop and utilize materials and machines in
ways that are not compatible with the organizational capabilities of most American
companies, even when the capabilities of their managerial structures have remained intact
[Lazonick 1990:chs.9-10].
Machines
From the industrial revolution in the Lowell textile mills and the advent of the "American
system of manufactures" in the Springfield Armory, Americans pioneered in mass
production methods that embodied the strength and skill requirements of production in
machines. The innovations in machinery displaced the skills of craft workers on the shop
floor. At the same time, the integrated character of these innovations created demands
for engineering skills that could be systematically applied in one factory after another and
for managerial coordination to ensure high rates of utilization of the investments in
expensive machines and highly trained personnel.
The American system of mass production evolved over decades not only within industrial
sectors but also through the intersectoral transfer of mass-production technologies [see
Hounshell 1984; Thomson 1989]. At every stage, the design of machinery reflected the
managerial goal of taking skills off the shop floor. At the same time, ever more formidable
organizational capabilities were put in place within the managerial structures of the major
corporations to develop new technologies and ensure their utilization.
The Japanese confronted these capabilities head on. In the decades after World War I,
they took on the once-dominant British economy in cotton textiles -- an industry in which
Britain had continued to dominate global competition before the war [Lazonick and Mass
1993]. In the decades after World War II, they took on the United States, not, as we have
already mentioned, in those industries in which the Americans were weakest but, on the
contrary, in those industries -- steel, consumer electronics, and automobiles -- in which
the United States had reigned supreme. Nor was it a "miracle" that Japan was able to




accomplished much the same feat in cotton textiles against the British before World War
II, and had, in the process, built up technical capabilities that could be transferred to the
higher value-added industries.
What had enabled the Japanese to challenge the British so successfully were their
investments from the 1870s in engineering skills that could be embodied in new
technologies on the shop floor. And what made the Japanese challenge to the United
States so successful was the combination of investments in engineering skills (in which
the Americans had invested as well) and complementary shop-floor skills.
Indeed, it is widely recognized that the ability of engineers to interact with shop-floor
workers has been key to Japanese success in introducing and making effective use of
flexible manufacturing systems in such industries as automobiles and consumer elec-
tronics [Hayes 1981; Jaikumar 1986; Cole 1989]. Such organizational integration of
technical skills has also been key to the success of the Japanese in rapid product
development [Clark and Fujimoto 1991]. In the United States, the failure to invest in the
skills of shop-floor workers combined with the deeply entrenched segmentation between
management (including engineers) and labor have posed formidable constraints on
companies in utilizing advanced machine technologies.
Materials
The emphasis in the development of U.S. manufacturing methods has been on the
attainment of high levels of throughput by integrating the strength and skill requirements of
the production process into the capabilities of machines. The high-throughput potential of
these machines cannot be realized, however, without materials of sufficient durability and
flexibility to undergo processing at high speed without breaking. Hence the need for
American mass producers to integrate the preparation of key materials into the planned
coordination in order to ensure such consistently high quality.
Typically American companies have achieved such integration through in-house
producers, leaving it to external suppliers to supply materials that can be produced subject
to standard specifications and that do not require further transformation by high-
throughput machinery. In the preparation of those materials that are integral to high-
throughput methods, however, the lack of skills on the American shop-floor makes it
difficult to control for quality, and hence large inventories are required to ensure that
enough materials of sufficiently high quality are constantly available to avoid disruptions
to the flow of work.
Any such disruptions are particularly serious in the American context, moreover, because
shop-floor workers typically have neither the skills nor the prerogative to determine the
source of quality problems. Even when materials consistently meet the quality test for
high-throughput processing, this absence of shop-floor skills and initiative still often means
that materials that are defective for delivering the services of the final product are not
detected in the production process, but are built into the final product.
The Japanese have been much more adept than the Americans at materials innovation
because of relations with workers and suppliers that integrate their activities into the
learning process of the organization. This. organizational integration enables the
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Japanese to produce materials of more consistent quality, and hence enhances their
ability to utilize high-throughput machinery with a minimum of materials wastage. As the
Japanese have demonstrated in the implementation of just-in-time inventory systems,
processed materials of consistent quality permit higher throughput without constant
human interventions and without requiring large buffer inventories of these materials.
The engineering capabilities required to make the Japanese production system work rely
on not only the analytical skills of professional engineers but also, as in the case of
statistical quality control, the complementary, and organizationally integrated, analytical
skills of both workers on the shop floor and suppliers in legally distinct firms. It is the
inability to achieve this, integration of skills extending down to the shop floor and across
legally distinct firms that has constrained American managers to use higher quality (and
hence more expensive) raw materials combined with large inventories of processed
materials. It is this same lack of organizational integration that has inhibited the diffusion
of computer programmable machinery in American industry in sharp contrast with its rapid
diffusion in Japanese industry [Lazonick and West 1994].
Especially in the more capital-intensive industries where high throughput is more critical to
low unit costs, the American system permitted competitive advantage during the first half
of the century, despite the high wages of even unskilled American workers. Among
manpower organized within the management structure, the Americans had developed the
organizational capabilities to develop and utilize high-throughput machinery. American
management then combined these high-throughput machines with abundant supplies of
high-quality (but expensive) materials and unskilled immigrants, and then, increasingly,
African-American labor.
Over the past few decades, however, the American system has been unable to sustain its
competitive advantages of the past. Through indigenous innovation in the combination of
manpower, machines, and materials, Japanese management generated a continuous,
cumulative, and collective learning process that, as it developed, increasingly challenged
the American system in terms of productivity and cost. To be sure, lower wages and
interest rates in Japan helped their enterprises to capture markets even before they had
achieved the high levels of productivity of the Americans. But, as recent years have
shown, the continuous development of productive capabilities in Japan, compared with
relatively stagnant productivity growth in the United States, has enabled the Japanese to
gain competitive advantage over the Americans even with similar factor prices.
Markets
Well into the twentieth century, the United States used tariff protection to enable its
domestic industries to substitute for cheaper foreign products. Throughout the twentieth
century, Japan has done the same, although it has supplemented tariff protection with
many other trade barriers ranging from restrictions on the size of retail outlets to content
requirements to quotas. In the cases of both the United States and Japan, this import
substitution strategy permitted enterprises and industries to engage in indigenous
innovation, and thereby ultimately replace import substitution with export expansion.
Within the keiretsu structure, Japanese companies typically set up distinct enterprises to
service markets in new industries [Fruin 1993]. Given that these new firms maintain
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membership in the keiretsu structure, the Japanese can attain the same benefits of the
multidivisional structure by sharing certain organizational capabilities - for example,
research or marketing facilities - across firms.
Where the Japanese differ markedly from the Americans, however, is in pushing
economies of scope down to the shop floor. The Japanese system of production, with its
integration of engineering and shop-floor skills, has made it possible to use the same plant
to manufacture products for a number of different market segments of an industry.
Speedy ("single digit" for less than ten minutes) changeovers allow Japanese industrial
plants to shift flexibly from one product variety to another. In some industries, such as
automobiles, engineers have structured the production process so that, in conjunction with
shop-floor skills, many different product varieties can be produced simultaneously on the
same machines. American companies, with their traditional segmentation between
management and workers, have been unable to generate such shop-floor economies of
scope [Best 1990].
IV. Indigenous Innovation in Japanese Cotton Textiles
What are the implications of the analysis of the innovative enterprise in general and the
Japanese case in particular for the developing economies? In our view, an enormous
intellectual barrier to answering, this question is the discipline of de velopment economics
itself. Most Western development economists have sought to devise policies for the
economic development of the industrially backward economies''without 'an adequate
understanding of the historical forces, social and technological, 'that contributed to the
success of the advanced industrial economies.
In historical perspective, the Japanese case reveals the importance of engaging in the
process of indigenous innovation early and sustaining the indigenous innovation process
over the long run. Indeed, before the Japanese economic "miracle" based on automobiles
and consumer electronics in the post-World War II decades, the Japanese economy had
undergone another "miracle" based on cotton textiles [Mass and Lazonick 1;990; Lazonick
and Mass 1993; Mass and Miyajima 1993]. The story of how, from the 1870s, the
Japanese developed their cotton textile industry to make it a dominant global competitor
by the 1930s reveals much about the institutional, organizational," and technological
features of industrialization generated by indigenous innovation, and provides a contrast
to the attempts by many developing economies to generate industrialization by means of
import substitution.
The Meiji Restoration of 1868 brought into political power in Japan an elite bent on
building the industrial capabilities of the economy. A key step in this direction was state
investment in mass schooling and higher education. Of particular importance for
technological development was the creation of engineering universities that provided the
Japanese with the conceptual capability to learn about technological developments
around the world.
From the 1870s major Osaka spinning companies employed these engineers, often
sending them to study technology abroad, and then using them at home to modify and
adjust imported machinery to make effective use of a materials strategy known as "cotton
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blending". The engineering challenge was to achieve high levels of productivity while
using less expensive cotton that, without engineering, would break more often in the
spinning process and thus reduce throughput.
The Japanese strategy in the use of cotton (which could account for 80-90 percent of the
value of spun yarn) differed markedly from the materials strategies adopted by spinning
firms in Britain and the United States. In Britain, spinning mills bought their cotton from
week to week in Liverpool, the site of the world's largest cotton exchange. Although the
British often blended cotton of different staples and grades, the choice of blend depended
on short-run fluctuations in the relative prices of staples and grades of cotton rather than
long-run productivity considerations [Lazonick and Mass 1984]. To adjust to these con-
stantly changing blends, the spinning mills relied on the skills and efforts of craft workers
operating traditional spinning machines, rather than university-trained engineers. The
cotton-cost cutting strategy of British cotton textile producers generated yarn that was too
break-prone to be economical when used on the Draper automatic loom, thus resulting in
a virtual neglect of the machine in Britain when it was rapidly diffusing in the United
States.
In Japan, by contrast, the choice of cotton blend by a spinning mill reflected the
enterprise's long-term technology strategy. Japanese mills typically purchased quantities
of Indian and American cotton of consistent staple and grade to last at least six months,
and rarely changed the cotton blend. Knowledgeable foreign visitors to Japanese
spinning companies took note of the cotton-blending strategy and remarked that each mill
had a specialized blending formula that it kept a well-guarded secret.
As in Japan, spinning mills in the United States sought to achieve high levels of
productivity by holding large stocks of cotton of consistent staple and grade to be used on
advanced technology to increase the rate of throughput in the production process. Unlike
the Japanese, however, the Americans favored the use of unblended, high quality (and
hence expensive) cotton. By minimizing yarn breakages in the spinning and weaving
processes, the high-quality, unblended cotton substituted for expensive engineering and
operative labor. Given the high cost of labor in the United States, the American strategy
was one that embodied technological capabilities in the cotton input while minimizing the
need for the employment of skilled labor on the shop floor. In contrast, the Japanese
strategy substituted highly trained engineering labor for higher quality cotton.
The choice of materials strategy, therefore, generated a need for indigenous learning.
This need was filled in Japan by the university-trained engineers in whom the major
spinning companies invested to transform them into a textile technologists. A major
element of the investment in these personnel was a six- to twelve-month stint studying
technology abroad [see Hunter 1991].
But the developmental impact of the Japanese cotton-blending strategy went even further.
In the 1890s the Americans generated a breakthrough weaving technology -- the Draper
automatic loom -- that was designed for use with longer staple unblended American cotton
[Mass 1989a and Mass 1989b]. Rather than adopt a machine technology that was
unsuited to their production methods, the Japanese sought to develop their own automatic




The automatic mechanism on the Draper loom changed the bobbin of weft yarn in the
loom's shuttle, whereas the mechanism on the Toyoda automatic loom changed the whole
weft shuttle with a fresh bobbin of yarn inside. Those who think that a machine is a
machine might count the Toyoda automatic loom, diffusing rapidly as it did some three
decades after the Draper automatic loom, not as an indigenous innovation, but at best a
borrowed imitation. Such"thinking is wrong. It took the founders of the Toyoda Automatic
Loom works, Sakichi Toyoda and his son Kiichiro (a graduate of the Tokyo University
Engineering School), over'twodecadees of persistent experimentation to develop their
version of the automatic loom. When the perfected Tyoda automatic loom became
available, moreover, it was a phenomenal success. Why would such effort have been put
into, and such results have been generated by, a machine that was simply an imitation of
the thirty-year-old American innovation?
The Toyoda automatic loom was not a borrowed imitation. The Toyoda automatic loom
was an indigenous innovation because it fit the investment strategies and organizational
structures of Japanese cotton textile manufacturers in ways that the Draper automatic
loom could not. The need for indigenous innovation in automatic weaving derived not only
from the high price that the Draper Company exacted for its looms, but more
fundamentally from the strategy of the major Japanese spinning mills of blending short-
staple (and hence less " expensive) Indian cotton with long-staple (and hence more
expensive) American cotton in the spinning of yarn.
Why were Sakichi and Kiichiro Toyoda able to respond to this challenge? Given that the
development of an automatic loom suitable for Japanese manufacturing conditions took
over two decades, the Toyodas were 'obviously dedicated and persistent. But they had
more going for them than perseverance. The financial resources and skills that Sakichi
and Kiichiro Toyod'a brought to 'their automatic loom enterprise came from previous, less
complex, efforts at indigenous innovation in which Sakichi had been successful.
In the 1890s Toyoda was among the pioneers in the development of an inexpensive but
productive wooden power loom that small weaving firms, producing for the home market,
could use instead of either the low-productivity hand loom or the expensive power loom
imported mainly from the British company, Platt Brothers. The Toyoda power looms
diffused quickly to the decentralized weaving sector that was producing cotton cloth for
the Japanese market. Sakichi Toyoda also produced iron power looms for the export-
oriented "spinning" companies, and these machines too diffused quickly as these
companies either integrated forward or replaced existing Platt Brothers power looms.
Following disputes over continuing support for costly R&D, Sakichi left the loom
manufacturing company that still bore the Toyoda name. He established textile
manufacturing enterprises whose profits continued to be devoted to loom technology
development.
In contrast to weaving machinery, in spinning machinery there was little import substitution
in Japan until the 1930s, even though some companies, including Toyoda, attempted to
develop an indigenous line of spinning machines. In continuing to import British textile
machinery, however, the Japanese relied to an extraordinary degree on just one
company, Platt Brothers. The relation between Platt Brothers and the major Japanese
spinning companies was not an arm's-length market relation but an ongoing collaboration
in engineering the type of textile machinery that the Japanese cotton spinning companies
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required. In contrast, textile mills in other Asian and Latin American nations acquired
machinery "off-the-shelf' from a variety of foreign companies, with price and current
productivity performance rather than the potential for technological development and cost
reductions as the main purchasing criteria.
The Toyoda automatic loom increased labor productivity in Japanese weaving operations
by anywhere from 3 to 19 times depending on the cloth being woven and the machines
previously used. The diffusion of the innovation was rapid: 17,000 machines installed by
1931 and 40,000 by 1936. Taking the lead in adopting the new technology were the
major "spinning" companies that dominated the Japanese cotton textile industry and that
had integrated spinning and weaving operations since the late nineteenth century. In
addition, however, by the late 1930s some 30 percent of the industry's automatic looms
were in specialized weaving mills that purchased their yarn from the integrated "spinning"
companies and that sold their cloth for export through the powerful trading companies. In
the export boom of the 1930s, the trading companies, large-scale spinning companies,
machinery makers, trade associations, and federal and local governments all played roles
in encouraging and enabling small-scale weaving firms to make investments in state-of-
the-art technologies. Such integrated investment strategies across vertically specialized
firms remained characteristic of the Japanese cotton textile industry during the post-World
War II decades, and enabled the industry to remain competitive against low-wage Asian
producers into the 1980s [Dore 1986].
The introduction of the Toyoda automatic loom was a critical factor -- although not the only
factor -- in Japan's rise to international dominance of world cloth exports in the interwar
period. In the China market, for example, Britain, Japan's main competitor, had supplied
53 percent of cotton cloth imports in 1913 compared with 20 percent for Japan. In 1921,
each nation had a 43 percent share. In 1925, however, the British share fell to 24 percent
while Japan's share climbed to 66 percent. In 1930, Britain's share was 13 percent and
Japan's share was 72 percent. A shift in market shares, just as dramatic, occurred in
India as well. Between 1914 and 1932, while Britain's share of Indian cloth imports
declined from 97 percent to 50 percent, Japan's share rose from 0.1 percent to 45
percent.
But it was not just the Japanese cotton textile industry that benefited from indigenous
innovation in textile machinery. By 1938 Japan had not only substituted its own weaving
machinery for British imports at home but had also become (after Britain) the second
largest exporter of textile machinery by volume in the world and (after Britain and
Germany) the third largest by value. In addition, indigenous innovation in textile
machinery provided Japanese industry with many of the capabilities needed to move into
more complex technologies such as automobiles.
In one case the transition from textile machinery to automobiles was remarkably direct. In
the 1930s the Toyoda Automatic Loom Company gave birth to the Toyota Motor
Company, with the first Toyota car being produced at the automatic loom works. An auto-
matic loom has over three thousand parts that have to be unified into one smoothly
running machine, so prolonged experience in building these looms was invaluable for
producing cars. For example, the assembly line for Toyoda automatic looms was the first
in Japan to use a conveyor belt system as a test bed for automobile manufacturing.
Continuity in finance was also important to continuity in innovation: the actual funds that
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Toyoda allocated to its venture into automobiles came from the licensing of the Toyoda
automatic loom to Platt Brothers, the company from which, going back to the emergence
of the Japanese cotton textile industry in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese had
purchased virtually all of their imported machines.
V. Indigenous Innovation and the Developing Economies
The Toyoda-Toyota story, which is the subject of an ongoing collaborative research
project [Lazonick, Wada, Mass, and Miyajima 1993] is not an isolated instance of
indigenous innovation in Japan. A recent book by Takeshi Hayashi [1990] summarizes
the results of a major United Nations University project on technology transfer to Japan
that included a number of historical studies of indigenous innovation in industries such as
mining, rail transportation, iron and steel. and textiles in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. Hiroyuki Odagiri and Akira Goto [1993] provide a century-long
overview of "the Japanese system of innovation", with numerous examples of indigenous
technological development. Yukiko Fukasaku [1992] has done an in-depth study of
indigenous innovation, especially in engines and welding, at the Mitsubishi Nagasaki
shipbuilding company from the 1880s to the 1930s. The detailed research by Michael
Cusumano [1985] on Toyota and Nissan also shows how the Japanese used their
organizational capabilities to transform borrowed technology. Leonard Lynn [1982] has
offered his extremely well-researched case study of the Japanese adoption of the basic
oxygen furnace as an example of (in Lynn's words) "a unique social capacity to adopt and
improve foreign technology explains much of Japan's economic success." Richard
Samuels [1994] has shown how "indigenization" was integral to the Japanese strategy
linking economic development and national security.
More generally, in a recent article on technological accumulation and economic growth,
Martin Bell and Keith Pavitt [1993] have highlighted the "misleading distinction between
'innovation' and 'diffusion"'. They argue that "diffusion involves more than the acquisition
of machinery or product designs, and the assimilation of related operating know how. It
also involves continuing, often incremental, technical change by which the original innova-
tions are (i) moulded to fit particular conditions of use in a widening range of specific
situations, and (ii) further improved to attain performance standards beyond those
originally achieved." What we have called indigenous innovation fits both these criteria.
As illustrated by the case of Japanese cotton textiles, a continuous, cumulative, and
collective learning process that generates vertical and even intersectoral linkages
characterizes industrialization based on indigenous innovation. Such dynamic learning
processes and industrial linkages are absent from industrialization based simply on import
substitution -- that is, technological diffusion without technological innovation. As Albert
Hirschman [1971:93-94] put it several decades ago, import-substituting industrialization
"brings in complex technology, but without the sustained technological experimentation
and concomitant training in innovation which are characteristics of the pioneer industrial
countries."
For the developing economies, the case of Japan shows that when import substitution is
combined with a dynamic learning process, export expansion and sustained economic
growth can be the results. Certainly, the case of Japanese textiles puts to rest the notion
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that the way for a less developed economy to compete is through cheap wages. The
challenge of economic development is to transform low wages into high wages through
indigenous innovation. The productivity growth that results from the innovation process
permits the innovating enterprises, regions, and economies to outcompete lower wage
rivals while paying their workers higher and higher wages.
An understanding of indigenous innovation makes it clear that notions of technological and
economic convergence through the international transfer of technology underestimate the
problems of utilizing borrowed technology [for the convergence debate see Baumol,
Nelson, and Wolff 1994]. Technology that is merely borrowed tends to be technology that
cannot be utilized because the borrowers do not have in place the necessary
organizational and institutional structures that can transform machines into productivity
[see Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1995b]. Conversely, an economy that has put in place the
organizations and institutions that permit a dynamic learning process to occur will, by
virtue of the presence of those organizations and institutions, have the ability to develop
and utilize the technologies that it has borrowed. It will, that is, have the social capability
to engage in indigenous innovation.
The problem that confronts developing economies, therefore, is how to transform import
substitution into indigenous innovation. The policy implications of the need to make this
transformation are immense, and demand intelligent debate. The future progress of such
debate requires a theory of economic development that is rooted in the innovative
enterprise and organizational learning that has characterized the industrialization
experiences of the most successful economies. Only then -- when those concerned with
development policy have grasped the continuous, cumulative , and collective character of
successful economic development -- can academics and policy makers begin to
contemplate why continuous, cumulative, and collective development has for so long
eluded so many nations of the world.
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